Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Arbeitspapier

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that monetary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetaiy Union (EMU) while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 238

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: European Monetaiy Union ; Interest Groups ; Banking Policy ; Bank Cooperation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grüner, Hans Peter ; Hefeker, Carsten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
• (where): Konstanz
• (when): 1994

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101558
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET