Universal Banking and Corporate Control

Artikel

Many researchers claim that the German universal banks’ great influence in corporate control is harmful, since these banks are often both debt holders and equity owners of the firm. However, in this paper I argue differently. Analyzing the banks’ role as investors, I find that, due to contractual incompleteness, investor control and the ownership of both equity and debt complement one another. Only if the investor’s control is combined with mixed finance can the maximization of the firm’s value be ensured. Moreover, if the initial investment is large enough, investor control is the only system that results in efficient decision making.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Schmalenbach Business Review ; ISSN: 1439-2917 ; Volume: 2002 ; Year: 2002 ; Issue: Special Issue 1 ; Pages: 79-105 ; Düsseldorf: Handelsblatt Fachmedien

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bankruptcy; Liquidation ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
• Subject: Universalbank ; Corporate Governance ; Finanzierungstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schäfer, Dorothea
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Handelsblatt Fachmedien ; ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141826
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET