Strategic trading and trade reporting by corporate insiders

Arbeitspapier

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2011/04

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• Thema: Insider Trading ; Directors' Dealings ; Corporate Governance ; Market Efficiency ; Insiderhandel ; Publizitätspflicht ; Insiderrecht ; Börsenkurs ; Markteffizienz ; Internes Kontrollsystem ; USA

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Betzer, André ; Gider, Jasmin ; Metzger, Daniel ; Theissen, Erik
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57346
• URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-91473
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ