Arbeitspapier
The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence
The paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams and the relationship between the inspector and the inspected party. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we find that adding an inspector does not simply result in more observed violations it increases the severity of sanctions imposed on those violations that are detected. We also find that inspectors who are more familiar with the offender impose less severe sanctions. We only find weak evidence that increasing sanction severity deters incidents such as oil spills.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7876
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
inspections
enforcement
deterrence
offshore oil
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Muehlenbachs, Lucija
Staubli, Stefan
Cohen, Mark A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Muehlenbachs, Lucija
- Staubli, Stefan
- Cohen, Mark A.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
Deterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery
Disgusting familiarity
The deterrence effect of immigration enforcement in transit countries: Evidence from Central American deportees
The Deterrence Effect of Immigration Enforcement in Transit Countries: Evidence from Central American Deportees
AI-driven Market Manipulation and Limits of the EU law enforcement regime to credible deterrence
Familiarity; Steam statues
Entry Deterrence
Enhancing metasurface fabricability through minimum feature size enforcement
Tension - familiarity - serenity : Portfolio
Deterrence and disarmament
Theft and deterrence
Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
Deterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery
Disgusting familiarity
The deterrence effect of immigration enforcement in transit countries: Evidence from Central American deportees
The Deterrence Effect of Immigration Enforcement in Transit Countries: Evidence from Central American Deportees
AI-driven Market Manipulation and Limits of the EU law enforcement regime to credible deterrence
Familiarity; Steam statues
Entry Deterrence
Enhancing metasurface fabricability through minimum feature size enforcement
Tension - familiarity - serenity : Portfolio
Deterrence and disarmament
Theft and deterrence
Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
Deterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery
Disgusting familiarity
The deterrence effect of immigration enforcement in transit countries: Evidence from Central American deportees
The Deterrence Effect of Immigration Enforcement in Transit Countries: Evidence from Central American Deportees
AI-driven Market Manipulation and Limits of the EU law enforcement regime to credible deterrence
Familiarity; Steam statues
Entry Deterrence
Enhancing metasurface fabricability through minimum feature size enforcement
Tension - familiarity - serenity : Portfolio
Deterrence and disarmament