Arbeitspapier
The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 469
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Subject
-
unemployment duration
benefit sanctions
monitoring
Arbeitslosigkeit
Dauer
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Schweiz
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lalive, Rafael
van Ours, Jan C.
Zweimüller, Josef
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lalive, Rafael
- van Ours, Jan C.
- Zweimüller, Josef
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2002