Arbeitspapier

The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 469

Classification
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Subject
unemployment duration
benefit sanctions
monitoring
Arbeitslosigkeit
Dauer
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Schweiz

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lalive, Rafael
van Ours, Jan C.
Zweimüller, Josef
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lalive, Rafael
  • van Ours, Jan C.
  • Zweimüller, Josef
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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