Arbeitspapier

A signalling model of environmental overcompliance

I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not tighten environmental standards. Production costs under the stricter environmental regulation are private information to the firms, and tightening environmental policy is socially desirable only if such costs are sufficiently low. The key assumption of the model is that firms differ in the cost of complying, and so those firms that enjoy a comparative advantage may actually benefit from tighter regulation. In these circumstances, such firms may overcomply in order to signal to the government that compliance costs are low, thus inducing the government to enforce stricter regulation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 77. 2000

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Thema
Environmental regulation
overcompliance
signalling
asymmetric firms
Umweltstandard
Umweltpolitik
Folgekosten
Asymmetrische Information
Signalling
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Denicolò, Vincenzo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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