Arbeitspapier
A signalling model of environmental overcompliance
I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not tighten environmental standards. Production costs under the stricter environmental regulation are private information to the firms, and tightening environmental policy is socially desirable only if such costs are sufficiently low. The key assumption of the model is that firms differ in the cost of complying, and so those firms that enjoy a comparative advantage may actually benefit from tighter regulation. In these circumstances, such firms may overcomply in order to signal to the government that compliance costs are low, thus inducing the government to enforce stricter regulation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 77. 2000
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Thema
-
Environmental regulation
overcompliance
signalling
asymmetric firms
Umweltstandard
Umweltpolitik
Folgekosten
Asymmetrische Information
Signalling
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Denicolò, Vincenzo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Denicolò, Vincenzo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2000
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Testing Dividend Signalling Models
Re-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs
A signalling theory of scapegoats
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Entrepreneurial school dropouts: A model on signalling, education and entrepreneurship
Competitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy models
A general equilibrium model of environmental option values
Use of Macroeconomic Models in Analysis of Environmental Problems in Norway and Consequences for Environmental
Signalling with career concerns
Waiting for signalling quality
Signalling in credit markets
Economics, Mathematical Models, and Environmental Policy
Testing Dividend Signalling Models
Re-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs
A signalling theory of scapegoats
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Entrepreneurial school dropouts: A model on signalling, education and entrepreneurship
Competitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy models
A general equilibrium model of environmental option values
Use of Macroeconomic Models in Analysis of Environmental Problems in Norway and Consequences for Environmental
Signalling with career concerns
Waiting for signalling quality
Signalling in credit markets
Economics, Mathematical Models, and Environmental Policy
Testing Dividend Signalling Models
Re-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs
A signalling theory of scapegoats
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Entrepreneurial school dropouts: A model on signalling, education and entrepreneurship
Competitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy models
A general equilibrium model of environmental option values
Use of Macroeconomic Models in Analysis of Environmental Problems in Norway and Consequences for Environmental
Signalling with career concerns
Waiting for signalling quality
Signalling in credit markets