Arbeitspapier

Regulatory independence and political interference: evidence from EU mixed-ownership utilities' investment and debt

This paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of independence; b) partial ownership of the state in the regulated firm; and c) the government's political orientation, which may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either more pro-firm or more pro-consumers. Our results show that regulatory independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), while ownership has no effect. Leverage also increases when the IRA is in place, especially so if the regulated firm is privately controlled. Finally political orientation does matter, as firm investment increases under more conservative (pro-firm) governments, but this effect appears to revert when the IRA is in place.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,69

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Economics of Regulation
Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General
Thema
Regulated Utilities
Investment
Capital Structure
Private and State Ownership
Regulatory Independence
Government's Political Orientation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cambini, Carlo
Rondi, Laura
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cambini, Carlo
  • Rondi, Laura
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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