FDI, International Trade and Union Collusion

Arbeitspapier

This paper deals with firms' decision related to international activities in a twocountry oligopoly model with a homogeneous product and unionized labor markets. Using a three-stage non-cooperative game with firms being first movers, it is found that firms' strategies are affected by the scale of fixed costs of direct investments, trade costs and union wage strategies in labor markets, giving rise to different productive structures in equilibrium. Scopes and incentives for unions' collusion are analyzed. The consequences on national welfare levels of both unions and firms' strategic behavior are also investigated, deriving some policy insights.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: FIW Working Paper ; No. 50

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Trade and Labor Market Interactions ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Foreign Direct Investment ; International trade ; Collusion ; Labor unions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Buccella, Domenico
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): FIW - Research Centre International Economics
• (where): Vienna
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121051
• Last update: 27.12.2079, 11:42 AM CET