Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work

Arbeitspapier

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 108

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings ; Social Security and Public Pensions
• Subject: Unemployment benefits ; financial incentives ; sanctions ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Lohnersatzleistungen ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Arbeitsvermittlung ; Arbeitsuche ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse ; Beschäftigungseffekt ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie ; Kürzung von Sozialleistungen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Boone, Jan ; van Ours, Jan C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20948
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET