Arbeitspapier

National interests and supranational resolution in the European Banking Union

We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 340

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Business and Securities Law
Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
Thema
SRB
SRF
bank resolution
banking union
bail-in
ESM
national interest
political economy
bureaucrats' incentives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Tröger, Tobias
Kotovskaia, Anastasia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.4024343
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Tröger, Tobias
  • Kotovskaia, Anastasia
  • Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Entstanden

  • 2022

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