Arbeitspapier
Tax harmonisation: Does the unanimity rule play a role?
In this paper, we analyse tax harmonisation in the framework of two asymmetric countries, differing with respect to their capital-labour endowments. In the first part, we analyse how national fiscal policies are decided when countries play a non-cooperative game. At the Nash equilibrium, inefficiency arises because of the corresponding misallocation of resources. Some forms of fiscal policy co-ordination are then studied within the institutional framework of the European Community, where such policy reforms are decided by the unanimity rule. We show that, while the imposition of a minimum level of capital taxation cannot pass, there exist some forms of tax convergence that can be accepted.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 33.1997
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Steuerharmonisierung
Finanzpolitik
Abstimmungsregel
Spieltheorie
Theorie
EU-Staaten
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Grazzini, Lisa
VanYpersele, Tanguy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Grazzini, Lisa
- VanYpersele, Tanguy
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1997