Arbeitspapier
Financial market integration and loan competition: when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
The paper analyzes how the removal of barriers to entry in banking affect loan competition, bank stability and economic welfare. We consider a model of spatial loan competition where a market that is served by less efficient banks is opened to entry by banks that are more efficient in screening borrowers. It is shown that there is typically too little entry and that market shares of entrant banks are too small relative to their socially optimal level. This is because efficient banks internalize only the private but not the public benefits of their better credit assessments. Only when bank failure is very likely or very costly, socially harmful entry can occur.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 403
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- Thema
-
Bank competition
Entry deregulation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kaas, Leo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kaas, Leo
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2004
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
Socially efficient entry barriers?
Socially efficient entry barriers?
Bank Branching Deregulation and the Syndicated Loan Market
Barriers to entry, deregulation and workplace training
Barriers to entry, deregulation and workplace training
Deregulation, Entry, and Competition in Local Banking Markets
Human competition is not lower if competing is socially wasteful instead of socially beneficial
Deregulation of Bank Entry and Branching: Impact on Competition
Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical Innovation?
Deregulation, Entry of Foreign Banks and Bank Efficiency in Australia
Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
Socially efficient entry barriers?
Socially efficient entry barriers?
Bank Branching Deregulation and the Syndicated Loan Market
Barriers to entry, deregulation and workplace training
Barriers to entry, deregulation and workplace training
Deregulation, Entry, and Competition in Local Banking Markets
Human competition is not lower if competing is socially wasteful instead of socially beneficial
Deregulation of Bank Entry and Branching: Impact on Competition
Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical Innovation?
Deregulation, Entry of Foreign Banks and Bank Efficiency in Australia
Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
Socially efficient entry barriers?
Socially efficient entry barriers?
Bank Branching Deregulation and the Syndicated Loan Market
Barriers to entry, deregulation and workplace training
Barriers to entry, deregulation and workplace training
Deregulation, Entry, and Competition in Local Banking Markets
Human competition is not lower if competing is socially wasteful instead of socially beneficial
Deregulation of Bank Entry and Branching: Impact on Competition
Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical Innovation?