Arbeitspapier

Fragility of resale markets for securitized assets and policy of asset purchases

Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictions predicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators. This supports investment and output. However, in a deep recession, characterized by high dispersion of asset qualities, there is a sudden surge in adverse selection due to an economy-wide default on reputation-based guarantees, which persistently depresses the output in the economy. Government policy of asset purchases limits the negative effects of adverse selection on the real economy, but may create a negative moral hazard problem.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2016-46

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Financial Crises
Subject
Business fluctuations and cycles
Economic models
Credit and credit aggregates
Financial markets
Financial stability
Financial system regulation and policies

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kuncl, Martin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2016-46
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kuncl, Martin
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2016

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