Coordination incentives in cross-border macroprudential regulation

Arbeitspapier

We discuss (dis)incentives for fair cooperation related to delegating macroprudential policy decisions to a supranational body, as well as their welfare implications. The question is studied by means of a signaling game of imperfect information between two national regulators. The model concentrates on informational frictions in an environment with otherwise fully aligned preferences. We show that even in the absence of evident conflicting goals, the non-transferrable nature of some regulatory information creates misreporting incentives. However, the major problem is not the reporting accuracy but the institutional arrangement focused on maximal multilateral satisfaction to the detriment of credible enforcement of rules. The main application is meant to be systemic risk management by the relevant EU institutions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IES Working Paper ; No. 21/2012

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Institutional Arrangements ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Noncooperative Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: macroprudential regulation ; integration ; autonomy ; information ; reporting ; Bankenaufsicht ; Regulierung ; Unvollkommene Information ; Signalling ; Spieltheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Derviz, Alexis ; Seidler, Jakub
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
• (where): Prague
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83360
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET