Arbeitspapier
Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation
The paper employs a standard model of dynamic price competition to study how international principles of value-added taxation affect the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market and tax rates differ across countries. In this framework, tacit collusion may be more likely to break up under either the destination or the origin principle, depending on the relation between costs of production and market size. A robust result is that tax rate harmonization increases the likelihood of tacit collusion under both tax principles considered.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 283
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Commodity taxation
dynamic price competition
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Haufler, Andreas
Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Haufler, Andreas
- Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2000
Other Objects (12)
Tacit Collusion under Destination - and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation
Dynamic effects of an anticipated switch from destination- to origin-based commodity taxation
Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy
Asymmetric commodity tax competition: Are tax rates always too low?
International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition
International commodity taxation under monopolistic competition
International Commodity Taxation Under Monopolistic Competition
Commodity Taxation and International Trade in Imperfect Markets
Commodity Taxation and international Trade in Imperfect Markets
Integration von Produktinformationen
Alternative tax principles for the European Community: A computable general equilibrium comparison
Die Besteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen
Tacit Collusion under Destination - and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation
Dynamic effects of an anticipated switch from destination- to origin-based commodity taxation
Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy
Asymmetric commodity tax competition: Are tax rates always too low?
International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition
International commodity taxation under monopolistic competition
International Commodity Taxation Under Monopolistic Competition
Commodity Taxation and International Trade in Imperfect Markets
Commodity Taxation and international Trade in Imperfect Markets
Integration von Produktinformationen
Alternative tax principles for the European Community: A computable general equilibrium comparison
Die Besteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen
Tacit Collusion under Destination - and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation
Dynamic effects of an anticipated switch from destination- to origin-based commodity taxation
Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy
Asymmetric commodity tax competition: Are tax rates always too low?
International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition
International commodity taxation under monopolistic competition
International Commodity Taxation Under Monopolistic Competition
Commodity Taxation and International Trade in Imperfect Markets
Commodity Taxation and international Trade in Imperfect Markets
Integration von Produktinformationen
Alternative tax principles for the European Community: A computable general equilibrium comparison