Informational Requirements of Nudging

Arbeitspapier

A nudge is a non-coercive paternalistic intervention that attempts to improve choices by manipulating the framing of a decision problem. As any paternalism, it faces the difficulty of determining the appropriate welfare criterion. We propose a welfare-theoretic foundation for nudging similar in spirit to the classic revealed preference approach, by investigating a model where preferences and mistakes of an agent have to be elicited from her choices under different frames. We provide characterizations of the classes of behavioral models for which nudging is possible or impossible. For the case where nudging is possible in principle, we derive results on the required quantity of information.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5327

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation ; Welfare Economics: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: nudge ; framing ; behavioral welfare economics

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Benkert, Jean-Michel ; Netzer, Nick
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110815
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ