Konferenzbeitrag

Cross Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly

We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds while the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a cross-holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This type of coordination leads to compensation contracts which make the managers less aggressive such that the firms involved in the coordination reduce their output while the outside firm increases its output. The reallocation of production induces a redistribution of profits: the outside firm and the most efficient firm owned by the index funds gain from the coordination while the less efficient firm owned by the index funds might suffer from a loss of profit if cost differences are large. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Organizations and Firms ; No. F09-V3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
Index funds
cross holdings
shareholder coordination
strategic manager compensation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stadler, Manfred
Neus, Werner
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Stadler, Manfred
  • Neus, Werner
  • ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Entstanden

  • 2018

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