Arbeitspapier
A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisfied in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-11
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Virtual monotonicity
Bayesian monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity
virtual Bayesian implementation
incentive compatibility
type diversity
Bayes-Statistik
Public Choice
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Serrano, Roberto
Vohra, Rajiv
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Providence, RI
- (when)
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2002
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Serrano, Roberto
- Vohra, Rajiv
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2002
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