Arbeitspapier
Make vs Buy in a Monopoly with Demand or Cost Uncertainty
The issue of technical progress under uncertainty is nested into the debate on vertical integration vs outsourcing, to show that, in general, the former is preferable to the latter in terms of both expected profits and technological efficiency. It is then shown that there exist (i) an optimal two part tariff where the unit price set by the upstream firm is conditional upon its R&D effort, and (ii) an optimal contract specifying the input price in terms of the initial capabilities of the sub-contractor, whereby the industry replicates the same performance as the vertically integrated firm as for both profits and R&D efforts.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 671
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Make-or- Buy-Entscheidung
Vertikale Integration
Outsourcing
Gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage
Schock
Industrieforschung
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
-
2009
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4574
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2009