Arbeitspapier

Make vs Buy in a Monopoly with Demand or Cost Uncertainty

The issue of technical progress under uncertainty is nested into the debate on vertical integration vs outsourcing, to show that, in general, the former is preferable to the latter in terms of both expected profits and technological efficiency. It is then shown that there exist (i) an optimal two part tariff where the unit price set by the upstream firm is conditional upon its R&D effort, and (ii) an optimal contract specifying the input price in terms of the initial capabilities of the sub-contractor, whereby the industry replicates the same performance as the vertically integrated firm as for both profits and R&D efforts.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 671

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Make-or- Buy-Entscheidung
Vertikale Integration
Outsourcing
Gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage
Schock
Industrieforschung
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4574
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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