Arbeitspapier
Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry
We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market. Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 782
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
barriers to entry
asymmetric information
switching costs
banking competition.
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bouckaert, Jan
Degryse, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bouckaert, Jan
- Degryse, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2002
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