Microcredit and price competition: Standardize to differentiate

Arbeitspapier

Microfinance institutions, despite the presence of competition and informational asymmetries, typically offer a limited variety of contracts. Assuming price competition, we propose a simple theoretical explanation for this behavior and study its consequences in terms of strategic interaction and borrower welfare. We model an oligopolistic market in which Microfinance Institutions design their contracts and choose how many of them to offer. We find that when offering a menu is costly, MFIs always offer a single contract. Despite that, there exist equilibria in which MFIs coordinate and offer screening contracts, allowing them to extract a large fraction of the borrower welfare. We discuss the policy implications of our model in terms of price caps, market entry and outreach measurement.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: LICOS Discussion Paper ; No. 349

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship ; Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
• Thema: Microfinance ; Competition ; Altruism ; Contract Menus ; Credit Rationing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Casini, Paolo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance
• (wo): Leuven
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101049
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ