Arbeitspapier

Group membership, competition, and altruistic versus antisocial punishment: Evidence from randomly assigned army groups

We investigate how group boundaries, and the economic environment surrounding groups, affect altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to platoons. We find that, without competition between groups, individuals are more prone to cooperate altruistically in a prisoner's dilemma game with in-group as opposed to out-group members. They also use a costly punishment option to selectively harm those who defect, encouraging a norm of cooperation towards the group. Adding competition between groups causes even stronger in-group cooperation, but also a qualitative change in punishment: punishment becomes antisocial, harming cooperative and defecting out-group members alike. These findings support recent evolutionary models and have important organizational implications.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5189

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
Thema
group membership
competition
punishment
army
experiment
Mitgliedschaft
Gruppenentscheidung
Kooperation
Altruismus
Soziales Verhalten
Schweiz
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goette, Lorenz
Huffman, David
Meier, Stephan
Sutter, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goette, Lorenz
  • Huffman, David
  • Meier, Stephan
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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