Arbeitspapier

Altruistic Punishment in Elections

Altruistic punishment is a fundamental driver for cooperation in human interactions. In this paper, we expand our understanding of this form of costly punishment to help explain a puzzle of voting behavior: why do people who are indifferent between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate in large-scale elections when voting is costly? Using a simple voting experiment, we show that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting is costly and the voter has no monetary stake in the election outcome. In our sample, we observe that at least fourteen percent of individuals are willing to incur a cost and vote against candidates who broke their electoral promises, even when they have no pecuniary interest in the election outcome.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4945

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
voting
elections
altruistic punishment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Aimone, Jason A.
Butera, Luigi
Stratmann, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Aimone, Jason A.
  • Butera, Luigi
  • Stratmann, Thomas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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