Do Couples Bargain over Fertility? Evidence Based on Child Preference Data

Arbeitspapier

Empirical literature has found evidence in favour of household bargaining models.In contrast to earlier tests that are limited to assignable private goods, we use childpreference data in order to extend the empirical evidence on household bargaining topublic household goods. In the empirical analysis, we exploit the different theoreticalpredictions for couples with heterogeneous and homogeneous preferences derivedfrom household models. Our results indicate that couples bargain over fertility.Furthermore, we find that the ability to commit to household resource allocationsdepends on the gender of the partner with higher preferences.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 92

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth ; Demographic Economics: Public Policy
• Thema: Fertility ; child preferences ; intra-household allocation ; bargaining ; limited commitment ; Familienplanung ; Verhalten ; Offenbarte Präferenzen ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Haushaltseinkommen ; Familienleistungsausgleich ; Familienökonomik ; Fruchtbarkeit ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hener, Timo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73757
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ