Arbeitspapier
Delay in joint projects
If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.
- Weitere Titel
-
Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Delay
private provision
public project
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kessing, Sebastian Georg
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kessing, Sebastian Georg
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2003
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