Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: An experiment

Arbeitspapier

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payo , it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2013-040

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: information revelation ; privacy ; lemons market ; level-k reasoning ; quantal response equilibrium ; inequality aversion

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Benndorf, Volker ; Kübler, Dorothea ; Normann, Hans-Theo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/91591
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ