Arbeitspapier
Monopoly power limits hedging
When a spot market monopolist participates in a derivatives market, she has an incentive to deviate from the spot market monopoly optimum to make her derivatives market position more profitable. When contracts can only be written contingent on the spot price, a risk-averse monopolist chooses to participate in the derivatives market to hedge her risk, and she reduces expected profits by doing so. However, eliminating all risk is impossible. These results are independent of the shape of the demand function, the distribution of demand shocks, the nature of preferences or the set of derivatives contracts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2008/37
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- Thema
-
Spot Market Power
Derivates Market
Hedging
Spotmarkt
Monopol
Finanzderivat
Finanzmarkt
Hedging
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Muermann, Alexander
Shore, Stephen H.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-60646
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Muermann, Alexander
- Shore, Stephen H.
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Entstanden
- 2008