Arbeitspapier

Monopoly power limits hedging

When a spot market monopolist participates in a derivatives market, she has an incentive to deviate from the spot market monopoly optimum to make her derivatives market position more profitable. When contracts can only be written contingent on the spot price, a risk-averse monopolist chooses to participate in the derivatives market to hedge her risk, and she reduces expected profits by doing so. However, eliminating all risk is impossible. These results are independent of the shape of the demand function, the distribution of demand shocks, the nature of preferences or the set of derivatives contracts.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2008/37

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
Spot Market Power
Derivates Market
Hedging
Spotmarkt
Monopol
Finanzderivat
Finanzmarkt
Hedging
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Muermann, Alexander
Shore, Stephen H.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-60646
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Muermann, Alexander
  • Shore, Stephen H.
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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