Konferenzbeitrag
Appointed public officials and local favoritism: Evidence from the German states
We study the local favoritism of appointed German state ministers. Matching hand-collected data on ministers’ place of residence to a sample of more than 8,000 west German municipalities during the period 1994–2013, we find that the home municipality of a state minister experiences higher employment growth than control municipalities. Given the institutional context, this effect is ostensibly due to apolitical favoritism (home bias) rather than electoral considerations. We conclude that favoritism may lead to a distortion in the allocation of public resources even in contexts with strong political institutions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Institutions ; No. A17-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
- Thema
-
Distributive politics
Favoritism
Employment growth
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baskaran, Thushyanthan
Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Baskaran, Thushyanthan
- Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana
- ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2018
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