Bounded reasoning and higher-order uncertainty

Arbeitspapier

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they form beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs and so on, that is, as if players have an infinite depth of reasoning. This strong assumption has nontrivial implications, as is well-known. This paper therefore generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) to model that players can have a finite depth of reasoning. The innovation is that players can have a coarse perception of the higher-order beliefs of other players, thus formalizing the small-world idea of Savage (1954) in a type-space context. Unlike the case in other models of finite-order reasoning, players with a finite depth of reasoning can have nontrivial higher-order beliefs about certain events. Intuitively, some higher-order events are generated by events of lower orders, making it possible for players to reason about them, even if they have a finite depth of reasoning.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1547

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: bounded rationality ; higher-order beliefs ; finite depth of reasoning

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kets, Willemien
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59686
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ