Incentive distortions in decentralized systems of governance – why is financing decentralized systems so difficult?

Konferenzbeitrag

National governments often choose to delegate tasks and burdens to lower levels in a comprehensive system of administration. Local and regional governance thereby becomes an important factor in policy implementation. This paper focuses on the incentive problem that follows from such a delegation of competences to collect taxes and do lending at the local level in a multi-level geo-administrative system. The paper uses the Danish administrative system to illustrate the actual outcomes from such incentive problems. A two-step estimation procedure will be used to derive results on the importance of incentive problems in multi-level geo-administrative systems. Setting up elaborate administrative systems will introduce agency problems that lead to inefficiencies in both local and national governance.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: 44th Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Regions and Fiscal Federalism", 25th - 29th August 2004, Porto, Portugal

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schmidt, Torben Dall
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): European Regional Science Association (ERSA)
• (wo): Louvain-la-Neuve
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117095
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ