Arbeitspapier

Profits and Politics: Coordinating Technology Adoption in Agriculture

This paper examines the political economy of coordination in a simple two-sector model in which individuals' choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization. We demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria; the economy is either characterized by the use of a traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized technology and a high level of industrialization. Relative to the traditional technology, the mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off. We show that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility of Pareto-improving coordination by an elected policy-maker, even when we allow for income redistribution.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Center Discussion Paper ; No. 922

Classification
Wirtschaft
Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
Structure and Scope of Government: General
Subject
Industrialization
Choice of Technology
Government Policy
Industrialisierung
Technologiewahl
Agrartechnik
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Pande, Rohini
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Yale University, Economic Growth Center
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Pande, Rohini
  • Yale University, Economic Growth Center

Time of origin

  • 2005

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