Arbeitspapier
How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?
Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2014:24
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Auctions
Market Design
- Thema
-
Ascending auction
assignment market
price control
Pareto efficiency
core
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andersson, Tommy
Yang, Zaifu
Zhang, Dongmo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andersson, Tommy
- Yang, Zaifu
- Zhang, Dongmo
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014