Arbeitspapier

How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?

Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2014:24

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Auctions
Market Design
Thema
Ascending auction
assignment market
price control
Pareto efficiency
core

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Andersson, Tommy
Yang, Zaifu
Zhang, Dongmo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
(wo)
Lund
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Andersson, Tommy
  • Yang, Zaifu
  • Zhang, Dongmo
  • Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2014

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