Arbeitspapier

Multidimensional global games and some applications

I extend the standard global games framework by introducing an addition target on which agents can coordinate on. I compare this multidimensional case to the standard global games problem. Furthermore, I investigate the effects of consolidating the multiple targets. I find that introducing an additional option generates a negative strategic correlation between the options and thus weakens the coordination. However, unifying the options eliminates the endogenous correlation and thus restores the coordination. I also show two potential applications to be modeled by these kinds of games.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2018/3

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Expectations; Speculations
Subject
global games
coordination

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vonnák, Dzsamila
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(where)
Budapest
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Vonnák, Dzsamila
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2018

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