Arbeitspapier
Multidimensional global games and some applications
I extend the standard global games framework by introducing an addition target on which agents can coordinate on. I compare this multidimensional case to the standard global games problem. Furthermore, I investigate the effects of consolidating the multiple targets. I find that introducing an additional option generates a negative strategic correlation between the options and thus weakens the coordination. However, unifying the options eliminates the endogenous correlation and thus restores the coordination. I also show two potential applications to be modeled by these kinds of games.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2018/3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Expectations; Speculations
- Thema
-
global games
coordination
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vonnák, Dzsamila
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vonnák, Dzsamila
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018