Artikel

Sustainable debt

We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the economy, self-insurance is more costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by the implicit threat of loss of the risk-sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private debt credibly circulates as a form of inside money, and it is not valued as a speculative bubble. Competitive equilibria with self-enforcing debt exist under a suitable hypothesis of gains from trade.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1513-1555 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Incomplete Markets
International Lending and Debt Problems
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Thema
Rate of interest
self-enforcing debt
Ponzi games
incomplete markets
competitive equilibrium
gains from trade

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bloise, Gaetano
Polemarchakis, Heraklis M.
Vailakis, Y.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE4173
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Bloise, Gaetano
  • Polemarchakis, Heraklis M.
  • Vailakis, Y.
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2021

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