Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence

Arbeitspapier

In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 709

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
• Thema: labor contract ; renewal ; delay ; Befristeter Arbeitsvertrag ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit ; Schätzung ; Theorie ; Israel

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Danziger, Leif ; Neuman, Shoshana
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20621
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ