Substitution Policy and Generic Competition

Arbeitspapier

I model the market for an active ingredient (with a brand-name drug and n differentiated generic versions) to study the effect of a substitution rule on prices and the extensive and intensive margin of generic competition. Both substitution rules with physician and patient veto decrease the brand-name price and shift market shares from the brand-name drug to the generics. A substitution rule with physician (patient) veto increases (decreases) generic prices and increases (decreases) the number of generic firms.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 241

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Analysis of Health Care Markets ; Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
• Subject: substitution rule ; generic competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Birg, Laura
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
• (where): Göttingen
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194354
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET