Arbeitspapier

Networks and markets: The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on trade

The purpose of this paper is to explore strategic incentives to use trade networks rather than markets and shed light on the dynamic relation between the two distinct trading systems: a formal system of markets and a issues in the infinitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma gamedecentralised system of networks. We investigate the with random matching. The existing literature emphasises the importance of information transmission in sustaining long-run cooperation in repeated personal transactions under perfect observability. By contrast, we show that a folk theorem may hold if we change the way traders are matched, without introducing any information sharing. We also examine different stages of the evolution of trading system. The study states conditions under which agents prefer to trade on networks rather than in markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2010-07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade: General
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Thema
repeated trade
moral hazard
matching
transaction costs
networks
institutions
Netzwerk
Handel
Matching
Transaktionskosten
Risiko
Spieltheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kumagai, Yuki
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kumagai, Yuki
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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