Arbeitspapier

Trust, values and false consensus

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Mis-calibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6916

Classification
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Subject
trust
trustworthiness
culture
false consensus
Vertrauen
Soziale Werte
Wahrnehmung
Spieltheorie
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Butler, Jeffrey V.
Giuliano, Paola
Guiso, Luigi
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Butler, Jeffrey V.
  • Giuliano, Paola
  • Guiso, Luigi
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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