Arbeitspapier
Trust, values and false consensus
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Mis-calibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 6916
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- Thema
-
trust
trustworthiness
culture
false consensus
Vertrauen
Soziale Werte
Wahrnehmung
Spieltheorie
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Butler, Jeffrey V.
Giuliano, Paola
Guiso, Luigi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Butler, Jeffrey V.
- Giuliano, Paola
- Guiso, Luigi
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2012