Arbeitspapier
Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers
The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among firms. Using worker level data for Germany we find that the hypothesis is supported empirically. Specifically, we find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the density of firms in a sector is higher within the local labor market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7853
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Education and Inequality
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- Thema
-
training
local labor markets
monopsony
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rzepka, Sylvi
Tamm, Marcus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rzepka, Sylvi
- Tamm, Marcus
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013