Arbeitspapier

Local Employer Competition and Training of Workers

The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among firms. Using worker level data for Germany we find that the hypothesis is supported empirically. Specifically, we find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the density of firms in a sector is higher within the local labor market.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7853

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Education and Inequality
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Thema
training
local labor markets
monopsony

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rzepka, Sylvi
Tamm, Marcus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rzepka, Sylvi
  • Tamm, Marcus
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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