Performance pay, sorting and social motivation

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

"Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms to attract more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance-pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance, and (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance-pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect." [author's abstract]

Object Details

• Extent: Seite(n): 412-421
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(2)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Wirtschaft ; Personalwesen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Eriksson, Tor ; Villeval, Marie Claire
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2008

Further information

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.10.003
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-268278
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST