Performance pay, sorting and social motivation

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

"Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms to attract more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance-pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We show that (i) the opportunity to switch from a fixed wage to variable pay scheme increases the average effort level and its variance, and (ii) high skill employees concentrate under the variable pay scheme; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages reduce the attraction of performance-pay. Social motivation and reputation influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect." [author's abstract]

Angaben zum Objekt

• Umfang: Seite(n): 412-421
• Sprache: Englisch
• Anmerkungen: Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(2)

Klassifikation und Themen

• Thema: Wirtschaft ; Personalwesen

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eriksson, Tor ; Villeval, Marie Claire
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.10.003
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-268278
• Rechteinformation: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 21.06.2024, 16:26 MESZ