Arbeitspapier
The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic 'guerilla warfare' strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3211
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
Colonel Blotto
conflict resolution
weakest-link
best-shot
multi-dimensional resource allocation
experiments
Konflikt
Spieltheorie
Netzwerk
Test
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kovenock, Dan
Roberson, Brian
Sheremeta, Roman M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kovenock, Dan
- Roberson, Brian
- Sheremeta, Roman M.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010