Arbeitspapier

The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic 'guerilla warfare' strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3211

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
Colonel Blotto
conflict resolution
weakest-link
best-shot
multi-dimensional resource allocation
experiments
Konflikt
Spieltheorie
Netzwerk
Test
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kovenock, Dan
Roberson, Brian
Sheremeta, Roman M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Roberson, Brian
  • Sheremeta, Roman M.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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