Arbeitspapier

Escaping Nash inflation

Mean dynamics govern convergence to rational expectations equilibria of self-referential systems under least squares learning. We highlight escape dynamics that propel away from a rational expectations equilibrium under fixed-gain recursive learning schemes. These learning schemes discount past observations. In a model with a unique self-confirming equilibrium, we show that the destination of the escape dynamics is an outcome associated with government discovery of too strong a version of the natural rate hypothesis. That destination is not sustainable as a self-confirming equilibrium but is visited recurrently. The escape route dynamics cause recurrent outcomes close to the Ramsey (commitment) inflation rate in a model with an adaptive government.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cho, In-Koo
Sargent, Thomas J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cho, In-Koo
  • Sargent, Thomas J.
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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