Escaping from Mass Education – Why Harvard Pays

Arbeitspapier

Private universities, as opposed to publicly financed ones, are dominant in some countries and almost non-existent in others. We develop a dynamic model to demonstrate that private providers emerge as soon as they can profitably sell an elite signal to the most highly talented. As private providers engage in cream skimming, the returns to publicly provided education decreases, but the average return to higher education increases because of the signaling benefit created. We use numerical simulations to demonstrate the dynamic implications of our model, and provide some basic empirical evidence in support of the theory presented

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005:2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Education ; Educational Finance; Financial Aid
• Subject: Higher education ; tertiary education ; Signaling

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bergh, Andreas ; Fink, Günther
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/259899
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET