Arbeitspapier

On the incentives to experiment in federations

Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized - due to the existence of a horizontal information externality - by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents a simple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competition political actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In the equilibrium analyzed policy innovation may occur more frequently than in a unitary system. It is thus shown that, once electoral motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom is likely to be a valid proposition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1585

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Regional Government Analysis: Other
Thema
fiscal federalism
policy innovation
policy experimentation
Föderalismus
Politik
Innovation
Public Choice
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kotsogiannis, Christos
Schwager, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kotsogiannis, Christos
  • Schwager, Robert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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