Arbeitspapier

Plunder & Protection Inc.

When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualiÞed violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this .market for extortion. the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the proÞtability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2002,10

Classification
Wirtschaft
General Economics: General
Subject
entrepreneurs
plundering
extortion
violence
Organisierte Kriminalität
Politisches System
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Mehlum, Halvor
Moene, Karl Ove
Torvik, Ragnar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Mehlum, Halvor
  • Moene, Karl Ove
  • Torvik, Ragnar
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2002

Other Objects (12)