Arbeitspapier
A theory of optimal green defaults
This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatementpolicies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaultingby subpopulations. In this special case ofbehavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need tobe adjusted in order to achievepolitically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: UFZ Discussion Paper ; No. 6/2015
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Economics of Regulation
Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Meran, Georg
Schwarze, Reimund
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ)
- (wo)
-
Leipzig
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Meran, Georg
- Schwarze, Reimund
- Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ)
Entstanden
- 2015