Arbeitspapier

A theory of optimal green defaults

This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatementpolicies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaultingby subpopulations. In this special case ofbehavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need tobe adjusted in order to achievepolitically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: UFZ Discussion Paper ; No. 6/2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Economics of Regulation
Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Environmental Economics: Government Policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Meran, Georg
Schwarze, Reimund
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ)
(wo)
Leipzig
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Meran, Georg
  • Schwarze, Reimund
  • Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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