Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee

Arbeitspapier

The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful codecision makers', understanding of the final stage of the procedure - bargaining in the Conciliation Committee - is crucial. Here, EP and CM are assumed to have spatial preferences determined by their respective internal decision mechanisms. Applying bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although institutionally the Council and the Parliament are seemingly in a symmetric position, CM has significantly greater influence on EU legislation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1029

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: European Union codecision procedure ; Conciliation Committee ; bargaining ; spatial voting ; decision procedures

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Napel, Stefan ; Widgrén, Mika
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76620
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ