Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

Arbeitspapier

We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker. For each a, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all vacancies post the same wage. When a= 1, the common posted wage lies between the competitive and monopsony levels, and equilibrium is efficient. When a > 1, all vacancies post the monopsony wage. Some workers fail to find a job, some find a job at the monopsony wage, and some—those for whom there is competition—get the competitive wage. Equilibrium is inefficient when a > 1; in particular, there is excessive vacancy creation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-004/3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Labor Contracts
• Thema: directed search ; matching ; wage dispersion ; efficiency. ; Suchtheorie ; Offene Stellen ; Lohntheorie ; Theorie ; Matching

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Albrecht, James ; Gautier, Pieter ; Vroman, Susan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85829
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ